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1 Introduction
The view that labor markets are imperfectly competitive, with employers possessing
some market power, has gained prominence in recent years. Empirical studies have come
upwithmany findings, such as the positive employment effects of minimumwages (Card
and Krueger, 1995), that are inconsistent with models of perfect competition. Two alter-
native approaches to modelling imperfect competition are search models (Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998) and models of monopsonistic competition (Bhaskar and To, 1999).1
In this paper, we provide a simple model of monopsonistic competition in the labor
market. Workers have heterogeneous preferences over employer characteristics, and each
employer competes equallywith every other employer in seeking to attract workers. This
may be contrasted with the circle model of monopsonistic competition in Bhaskar and To
(1999), where each employer effectively competes only with her two immediate neigh-
bors. Our model may be viewed as a Dixit-Stiglitz type model, since each firm competes
with every other firm, and when the number of firms is large, yields establishment la-
bor supply curves with approximately constant wage elasticity. However, we emphasize
that it is not a representative worker model—rather, it is based on heterogenous workers,
each of whom chooses to work for at most one employer. Our model is an adaptation of
Sattinger’s (1984) model of consumer choice to the labor market. This adaptation results
in some technical difficulties, since a realistic model of labor markets must allow for the
possibility that some workers may be unemployed.
We use this model to study the effects of a minimumwage upon employment in a free
entry equilibrium. As in other models of monopsonistic competition, a minimum wage
has two conflicting effects. First, it has the standard monopsony effect whereby a moder-
1Bhaskar et al. (2002) provide a discussion of the empirical evidence, and argue that models of oligop-
sony/monopsonistic competition provide a parsimonious explanation for much of this evidence. Manning
(2002) is a textbook on labor economics with an approach centered onmodels with employer market power.
ately chosen minimumwage reduces the marginal cost of labor, increasing labor supplied
to individual firms. Second, it has a first order negative effect on profits, causing firms
to exit, thus reducing employment. We find that the net effect of a small minimum wage
can be either positive or negative, depending upon parameter values. If fixed costs are
high, so that the equilibrium number of firms is small, and the labor market is relatively
non-competitive, then a small minimumwage increases employment. On the other hand,
if fixed costs are low, so that the labor market is relatively competitive, a minimum wage
reduces employment. In other words, the employment effect of a minimum wage is re-
lated to the extent to which the labor market is distorted. These results may be contrasted
with those obtained in the context of the circle model of the labor market used by Bhaskar
and To (1999). Walsh (2001) shows that in the circle model, the effect of a small minimum
wage upon employment is unambiguously positive.2
Interestingly, under some parameter configurations with the current model, minimum
wages can increase employment even when the labor market has many employers or
when the establishment level labor supply elasticity is high. This is of importance be-
cause one common argument is that even if there are labor market distortions, these dis-
tortions become insignificant in industries like fast food, where many employers compete
for workers. Our results show that even when a labor market appears to be competitive,
minimum wages can increase employment.
Finally, extensive numerical computations suggest that welfare unambiguously in-
creases when a minimum wage is imposed just above the equilibrium wage rate. That
is, the welfare gain due to increased wages outweighs the welfare loss resulting from the
reduction of job choices due to employer exit and from (potential) disemployment.
2Walsh corrects and clarifies the formulation in Bhaskar and To. AlthoughWalsh shows that it is possible
to modify the circle model to produce negative employment effects, these modifications require somewhat
unreasonable parameter restrictions. Further, these restrictions do not have an intuitive interpretation in
terms of the extent of labor market distortions.
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2 The Model
To ensure that labor supply is imperfectly elastic, we assume that different jobs have dif-
ferent non-wage characteristics. These include the job specification, hours of work, dis-
tance of the firm from the worker’s home, the social environment in the workplace, etc.
The importance of non-wage characteristics has been recognized in the theory of com-
pensating differentials, which is a theory of vertical differentiation. Some jobs are good
while other jobs are bad, and wage differentials compensate workers for these differ-
ences in characteristics. We assume that jobs are horizontally differentiated so that workers
have heterogenous preferences over these characteristics. McCue and Reed (1996) pro-
vide survey evidence of horizontal heterogeneity in worker preferences. Heterogeneous
preferences over non-wage characteristics ensures that each employer has market power
in wage setting, even if it competes with many other employers.
Our modelling of the labor market is inspired by Sattinger’s (1984) model of the prod-
uct market. The key difference is that we allow for unemployment (“home production”).
Let us suppose that the individual worker has the following utility function:
U = W 1−γLγ (1)
where W is the worker’s job-adjusted income (defined below) and L is time spent at
leisure activities. Let firms be indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each firm offers a “job” that has
characteristics that differ from its rivals andworkers have heterogeneous preferences over
these characteristics. We shall also assume that the alternative to outside employment is
home production which we denote as job 0.
The worker’s preferences over this set of n + 1 alternatives are parameterized by the
n + 1 vector r whose generic component rj is a measure of the worker’s disutility from
activity j. In particular, a larger value of rj reduces the value of working for employer j,
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at the offered wage wj . More specifically, we model this as follows. If a worker works hj
hours for wage wj and has disutility rj for working at job j then her disutility-adjusted
earnings from job j are wjhj/rj and her total job-disutility-adjusted income from all jobs
is W =
∑n
j=0wjhj/rj . Workers have likes and dislikes over job characteristics and an
unpleasant job (i.e., one for which rj is large) reduces the pleasure that a worker gets from
her income. We assume that the return to home production, w0, is exogenously specified.
If L¯ is the total amount of leisure time available then she enjoys L = L¯−∑nj=0 hj hours of
leisure.
Taking the first order conditions yield:
∂U
∂hj
= (1− γ)wj
rj
(
L
W
)γ
− γ
(
W
L
)1−γ
≤ 0 (2)
for j = 0, 1, . . . , n. For generic values of r, this conditionwill holdwith equality for exactly
one employer and with strict inequality for all other employers. This implies that indi-
vidual workers will work for at most one employer. Let j = argmaxk{wk/rk} represent
the employer for whom the first order condition holds with equality. Solving equation
(2), the worker’s labor supply to employer j is hj = (1− γ)L¯ and for all employers k 6= j
is hk = 0. If j happens to be home production, the worker will be unemployed.
Suppose that there is a unit mass of workers and that for each worker, her disutilities,
rj , are independently and identically distributed with a continuous distribution function
F and corresponding probability density function f . The conditional probability given rj
that the worker prefers employer j to employer k is 1−F (rjwk/wj). Thus the conditional
probability given rj that the worker prefers employer j to all other employers and to
staying at home is
∏
k 6=j[1 − F (rjwk/wj)]. Multiplying individual labor supply by this
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probability and integrating over all rj yields labor supply to firm j
Lj = (1− γ)L¯sj (3)
where sj is firm j’s share of total labor supplied (either for work or for home production)
and is given by:
sj =
∫ ∏
k 6=j
[
1− F
(
rjwk
wj
)]
f(rj)drj. (4)
For the case when all firms but j offer wage w−j , this becomes:
sj =
∫ [
1− F
(
rjw−j
wj
)]n−1 [
1− F
(
rjw0
wj
)]
f(rj)drj. (5)
Suppose that F is the Pareto distribution so that F (x) = 1−(b/x)a and f(x) = aba/xa+1
where a, b > 0 and x ≥ b. Consider employer j’s labor supply when all rival employers
offer wage w−j and wj, w−j > w0. The equation for firm j’s share of labor supplied can be
written as:
sj =

[
1−
(
w−j
wj
)a]
+ 1
n
[(
w−j
wj
)a
−
(
w0
w−j
)a(n−1) (
w0
wj
)a]
+ 1
n+1
(
w0
w−j
)a(n−1) (
w0
wj
)a
if wj ≥ w−j
1
n
[(
wj
w−j
)a(n−1)
−
(
w0
w−j
)a(n−1) (
w0
wj
)a]
+ 1
n+1
(
w0
w−j
)a(n−1) (
w0
wj
)a
if wj ≤ w−j
(6a)
For the case when wj, w−j < w0, sj can be written as:
sj =

1
2
[(
wj
w0
)a
−
(
w−j
w0
)a (
w−j
wj
)a]
+ 1
n+1
(
w−j
w0
)a (
w−j
wj
)a
if wj ≥ w−j
1
n+1
(
wj
w−j
)a(n−1) (
wj
w0
)a
if wj ≤ w−j
. (6b)
These expressions are rather complicated, however, for the case with symmetric wages
(i.e., wj = w−j = w), the establishment level elasticity of labor supply is given by the
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following, relatively simple expression:
ε =

a((n+1)(n−1)+(w0w )
an
)
(n+1)−(w0w )
an if w ≥ w0
an if w ≤ w0
. (7)
This is a weakly decreasing, continuous function of w and is bounded by a(n − 1) and
an. That is, as the market wage rate rises, the elasticity of labor supply falls. This is what
should be expected since if the wage is high relative to the return from home produc-
tion, home production becomes a less attractive substitute. Moreover, ε is an increasing
function of the number of firms, n. Differentiating ε with respect to n we get:
∂ε
∂n
=

a((n+1)2−(2n+1)(w0w )
an
+(n+1)(w0w )
an
ln(w0w )
an
)
(n+1−(w0w )
an
)
2 if w ≥ w0
a if w ≤ w0
. (8)
Consider the case whenw ≥ w0. Since−(2n+1)x+(n+1)x lnx is strictly decreasing for all
x ≤ 1, it follows that the minimum value of numerator is an2. Thus we can conclude that
∂ε/∂n > 0. As should be expected, establishment level labor supply becomes more elastic
as the number of employers increases. In particular we have the desirable result that as
the number of firms, n, grows large, the labor market approaches perfect competition
with establishment labor supply curves becoming perfectly (infinitely) elastic.
For a fixed number of firms in a symmetric equilibrium, wages will be set according
to the rule,
w(n) = φ
ε
1 + ε
(9)
where φ is the marginal revenue product of labor.3 Thus wages are a strictly increasing
3The assumption, that the marginal revenue product of labor is constant, is not really necessary. If
both capital and labor are required, and there is constant returns to scale and a competitive capital market,
Bhaskar and To (1999) show that when the capital labor ratio adjusts optimally, the “net revenue product”
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function of the labor supply elasticity. This implies that there is a unique, symmetric
equilibrium wage, w∗(n), satisfying equations (7) and (9).4 Moreover, since labor supply
elasticity rises with the number of employers, equilibrium wages do so as well.
Given the equilibrium wage rate, w∗(n), the equilibrium share of labor per firm is
given by
s∗(n) =

1
n
[
1−
(
w0
w∗(n)
)an]
+ 1
n+1
(
w0
w∗(n)
)an
if w∗(n) ≥ w0
1
n+1
(
w∗(n)
w0
)a
if w∗(n) ≤ w0
. (10)
As should be expected, if w∗(n) = w0 then each of the n + 1 activities garners an equal
share of labor supplied—i.e., s∗(n) = 1/(n+ 1).
The equilibrium profits of the firm are given by
pi∗(n) = (φ− w∗(n))L∗(n) (11)
where L∗(n) = (1 − γ)L¯s∗(n). This is decreasing in the number of firms for two reasons.
First, labor supply per firm is decreasing in n, and second, the wage is also higher with
n. To see the former, examine equation (13). The numerator is a scalar multiple of the
numerator of (8) and by similar argument we can show that εn < 0. Since labor supply
falls and wages rise with n, profits must fall with n. The free entry number of firms is an
n∗ such that pi∗(n∗)− c = 0where c is the fixed cost of production.
3 The effects of a minimum wage
When a minimum wage is imposed, establishment level employment rises due to the
monopsony effect, but total employment may fall because of induced firm exit. Recall
is constant.
4As noted by Sattinger (1984), there may well exist other, asymmetric equilibria. For tractability, we
focus only on the symmetric equilibrium.
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that establishment level employment is given by:
L(n) = (1− γ)L¯sj
where sj is as given in equations (6a) and (6b).
Let E denote total employment, Ln. In order to work out the employment effect of a
minimum wage under free entry, we utilize the following decomposition, due to Walsh
(2001):
dE
dwm
=
Ln
w
(
ε− ε−j
εn
)
where ε is the elasticity of firm labor supply with respect to the own wage, ε−j is the
elasticity with respect to competitor firm wages, and εn is the elasticity with respect to n.
The own wage elasticity of labor supply is given by equation (7). From the equation
for labor supply, ε−j and εn are as follows:
ε−j = −a(n− 1) (12)
εn =

− (n+1)
2−(2n+1)(w0w )
an
+(n+1)(w0w )
an
ln(w0w )
an
(n+1){n+1−(w0w )an} if w ≥ w0
− n
n+1
if w ≤ w0
. (13)
It is straightforward to show that there exist parameter values such that the employ-
ment effect of a minimumwage is positive. For example, consider parameter values such
that w∗ ≤ w0.5 In this case, ε = an and εn = −n/(n+ 1), so that
dE
dwm
=
L
w
a
That is, if the equilibrium wage is sufficiently small relative to the return from home
5Since the equilibrium wage, w∗, is bounded above by φ, we may choose φ so that w∗ is smaller than w0.
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production, a minimum wage increases employment.
Unfortunately, general conditions for negative employment effects are not possible
because of the non-linearity of the equilibrium system of equations. For this reason, we
numerically compute the equilibria for a wide range of parameters to establish that min-
imum wages can lower employment. We present a selection of these results in Table 1.
These results show that fixing other parameter values, the minimumwage effect depends
upon the fixed cost c.When fixed costs are relatively low, a minimum wage reduces em-
ployment. When the fixed cost is large, minimum wages increase employment. Since
fixed costs are the factor which prevent perfect competition from occurring, our results
have an intuitive interpretation—minimumwages raise employmentwhen the labormar-
ket is distorted, but reduce employment when the market is relatively competitive. Note
however that even for labor markets that appear to be highly competitive to a casual ob-
server (e.g., n > 850 or ε > 90), a minimum wage can still have a positive employment
effect. That is, even if a labor market appears, prima facie, to be competitive, a minimum
wage may increase employment under monopsonistic competition.
3.1 Welfare Effects
Let us now consider the utility of an individual with disutilities r = (r0, r1, . . . rn). Sup-
pose the equilibrium wage profile isw = (w0, w1, . . . wn). This worker will spend (1− γ)L¯
hours at activity j where j = argmaxwj/rj and γL¯ hours at leisure activities. Her indirect
utility can be written as:
U(w, r) = Kmax
(
wj
rj
)1−γ
(14)
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Table 1: Employment and welfare effects
a w0 c n w
∗ l ε employmenteffect
welfare
effect
0.01 0.90 0.00002 1531.9 0.939 0.00033 15.3 −0.003379 0.016
0.01 0.90 0.00004 1068.8 0.914 0.00047 10.7 −0.001426 0.023
0.01 0.90 0.00006 863.7 0.896 0.00058 8.6 0.000012 0.028
0.01 0.90 0.00008 741.5 0.881 0.00067 7.4 0.000014 0.032
0.01 0.95 0.000005 3112.6 0.969 0.00016 31.1 −0.00332 0.0081
0.01 0.95 0.000010 2186.2 0.956 0.00023 21.9 −0.00124 0.0114
0.01 0.95 0.000015 1775.9 0.947 0.00028 17.8 0.00001 0.0140
0.01 0.95 0.000020 1531.3 0.939 0.00033 15.3 0.00001 0.0161
0.25 0.90 0.0005 61.2 0.94 0.008 15.2 −0.0809 0.023
0.25 0.90 0.0010 42.2 0.91 0.012 10.6 −0.0285 0.033
0.25 0.90 0.0015 34.0 0.89 0.014 8.5 0.0073 0.040
0.25 0.90 0.0020 29.1 0.88 0.017 7.3 0.0086 0.045
0.25 0.95 0.0001 139.5 0.972 0.0036 34.7 −0.0884 0.011
0.25 0.95 0.0003 79.2 0.952 0.0062 19.8 −0.0065 0.018
0.25 0.95 0.0005 60.7 0.938 0.0081 15.2 0.0041 0.023
0.25 0.95 0.0007 50.8 0.927 0.0096 12.7 0.0049 0.027
0.25 0.99 0.000005 630.4 0.994 0.0008 157.5 −0.0812 0.0024
0.25 0.99 0.000010 444.8 0.991 0.0011 111.2 −0.0265 0.0033
0.25 0.99 0.000015 362.6 0.989 0.0014 90.7 0.0007 0.0041
0.25 0.99 0.000020 313.6 0.987 0.0016 78.4 0.0008 0.0047
1.00 0.90 0.002 15.3 0.94 0.032 14.8 −0.280 0.045
1.00 0.90 0.004 10.3 0.91 0.045 10.2 −0.019 0.062
1.00 0.90 0.006 8.1 0.89 0.054 8.1 0.124 0.075
1.00 0.90 0.008 6.8 0.87 0.062 6.8 0.148 0.084
1.00 0.95 0.0005 31.1 0.968 0.0158 30.6 −0.303 0.023
1.00 0.95 0.0010 21.5 0.955 0.0224 21.4 −0.064 0.032
1.00 0.95 0.0015 17.2 0.945 0.0273 17.2 0.058 0.039
1.00 0.95 0.0020 14.7 0.936 0.0314 14.7 0.068 0.045
1.00 0.99 0.00002 157.6 0.994 0.0032 157.1 −0.321 0.0047
1.00 0.99 0.00004 110.9 0.991 0.0045 110.8 −0.097 0.0067
1.00 0.99 0.00006 90.2 0.989 0.0055 90.2 0.011 0.0081
1.00 0.99 0.00008 78.0 0.987 0.0063 78.0 0.013 0.0094
Notes: The employment and welfare effects are elasticities with respect to
the minimum wage. For these computations, we fix various scale parame-
ters as follows: γ = 0.5, b = 1, φ = 1 and L¯ = 1. These numeric results were
computed using a FORTRAN program employing the non-linear equation
solver from the Argonne National Laboratory’s collection of optimization
subroutines, MINPACK-1.
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where K = (1 − γ)1−γγγL¯. For symmetric wage profiles where wj = w for j = 1, 2, . . . n,
indirect utility can be rewritten as:
U(xe, xu) = K (max{xe, xu})1−γ (15)
where xe = max{w/rj}nj=1 and xu = w0/r0. Each ratio, xj = wj/rj has cumulative dis-
tribution 1 − F (wj/xj). The random variable xe is an order statistic with cumulative dis-
tribution [1 − F (w/x)]n. Thus x = max{xe, xu} is a random variable that has cumulative
distribution G(x) = [1− F (w/x)]n[1− F (w0/x)]. Differentiating yields density function:
g(x) =
nw
[
1− F (w
x
)]n−1[
1− F (w0
x
)]
f
(
w
x
)
+ w0
[
1− F (w
x
)]n
f
(
w0
x
)
x2
(16)
Average utility is equal to a typical worker’s expected utility and can therefore be written
as
EU = K
∫
x1−γg(x)dx. (17)
As before, consider the case when F is the Pareto distribution. If w ≥ w0 then we can
write g as
g(x) =

a(n+1)
x
(
bx
w
)an(
bx
w0
)a
if x ≤ w0
b
an
x
(
bx
w
)an
if w0
b
≤ x ≤ w
b
. (18)
If w ≤ w0 then g can be written as:
g(x) =

a(n+1)
x
(
bx
w
)an(
bx
w0
)a
if x ≤ w
b
a
x
(
bx
w0
)a
if w
b
≤ x ≤ w0
b
. (19)
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Thus
EU = K

a(n+1)
a(n+1)+1−γ
(
w0
w
)an (w0
b
)1−γ
+ an
an+1−γ
[(
w
b
)1−γ − (w0
w
)an (w0
b
)1−γ] if w ≥ w0
a(n+1)
a(n+1)+1−γ
(
w
w0
)a (
w
b
)1−γ
+ a
a+1−γ
[(
w0
b
)1−γ − ( w
w0
)a (
w
b
)1−γ] if w ≤ w0 (20)
where n = n∗ and w = w∗(n∗).
Given the complexity of this expression, analytic welfare calculations are not possible.
However, numeric computations can be used to evaluate the welfare consequences of
a minimum wage. Some of these results are presented in Table 1. What appears to be
true is that for this model, assuming that the rj are distributed Pareto, minimum wages
unambiguously increase welfare. Since as is common with monopsonistic competition,
minimumwages have opposing welfare effects (increasing wages vs declining job choices
and potentially declining employment), we do not believe that this unambiguous welfare
result is robust to modelling changes or even changes in the assumed distribution of the
rj . Nevertheless, it is useful to observe that welfare can increase even as employment falls
so that the literature’s preoccupation with the employment effects of minimum wages
may be misguided.
4 Concluding Comments
We have developed a simple model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer
competes equally with all other employers for workers. This is similar to a Dixit-Stiglitz
style model, although it is based on heterogeneous workers, each of whom only works for
one employer. We find that the effect of a small, binding minimumwage is ambiguous: it
will be positive if the labor market is relatively distorted, and negative otherwise.
One point worth emphasizing is that even for labor markets that to all appearances
is competitive, a moderately chosen minimum wage can increase employment. For ex-
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ample labor market concentration might be considered a useful statistic for judging the
competitiveness of the labor market. However, as we have demonstrated, even for quite
large n, a minimum wage can still increase employment.
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